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Abstract 
We consider a system of two service providers each with a separate queue. Customers choose 
one queue to join upon arrival and can switch between queues in real time before entering 
service to maximize their spot utility, which is a function of price and queue length. We 
characterize the steady-state distribution for queue lengths, and then investigate a two-stage 
game in which the two service providers first simultaneously select service rates and then 
simultaneously charge prices. Our results indicate that neither service provider will have both a 
faster service and a lower price than its competitor. When price plays a less significant role in 
customers’ service selection relative to queue length or when the two service providers incur 
comparable costs for building capacities, they will not engage in price competition. When price 
plays a significant role and the capacity costs at the service providers sufficiently differ, they will 
adopt substitutable competition instruments: the lower-cost service provider will build a faster 
service and the higher-cost service provider will charge a lower price. Comparing our results to 
those in the existing literature, we find that the service providers invest in lower service rates, 
engage in less intense price competition, and earn higher profits, while customers wait in line 
longer when they are unable to infer service rates and naive in service selection than when they 
can infer service rates to make sophisticated choices. The customers’ jockeying behavior further 
lowers the service providers’ capacity investment and lengthens the customers’ duration of stay.  
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1. Introduction 
The service sector encompasses a vast spectrum of business activities including hospitality, 
trade, health care, communication, and more. A recent report by EconomyWatch estimates that 
it will account for 63.4% of global GDP by the end of 2011. The continuously growing market 
and expanding service networks expose service providers to fierce competition, for which 
service speed and price, in their different forms, are two of the frequently used instruments. It is 
imperative for the managers to understand their interplay to align operations and marketing 
initiatives. In academic literature, service systems have long attracted the interest of researchers. 
Service rate has been a main decision variable, with the expected waiting time as the primary 
measure for allocating customers into service. Gilbert and Weng (1998), for instance, consider a 
setting where the customers are allocated to servers by a system manager to equalize expected 
sojourn times at the two servers. Price has often been another factor in customer allocation. Li 
and Lee (1994) analyze price competition in a two-server system where the customer utility is 
modeled as a function of price and waiting time. Notably in the existing literature, service rate 
directly affects the allocation of customers. 
In practice, a customer often chooses a queue to join upon arrival according to the prices 
that service providers charge and actual queue lengths. Without a prior knowledge or observing 
over a period of time carefully, the customer is usually unable to estimate service speeds upon 
arrival to make choices. Also common is the phenomenon of customer jockeying. The changing 
of relative queue length often acts as a trigger for the customers to jockey, particularly when it 
is difficult for them to infer service speeds with sufficient confidence from service completions 
in the past. To the customer at the end of the queue that becomes relatively longer, the 
shortening of the other queue can be an indication of the difference in service speeds at the 
service providers to drive their jockeying behavior. Thus, service speed is not frequently used in 
practice for queue selection, although some imprecise estimate of it may drive jockeying. 
The competition of gas stations located at close proximity to each other provides a 
compelling example. The price at every gas station is easily observable. Drivers can check the 
posted prices and take queue lengths into consideration in selecting the station. When stations 
are comparably crowded, it is hard to tell which one has a faster service. While waiting, the 
drivers at the end of the line for one gas station can readily move the vehicle to another gas 
station, when the line of the latter seems to shorten faster. The service at the gas stations is fast 
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relative to the arrival rate of drivers. This makes it impractical for the drivers to observe enough 
service completions to infer service speeds before being served by a particular station. On the 
other hand, the waiting lines at gas stations are usually not long, and it is fair to argue that the 
drivers who intend to fill the gas will complete service at one station in the end.  
In this paper, we consider a system of two service providers each with a separate queue. 
Customers join one queue upon arrival and can switch in real time between queues to maximize 
their spot utility that is a function of queue length and price. We assume the existence of a 
maximum price, such that no customer will patronize a service provider if it charges a price 
higher than the maximum price, even when no customer is waiting for service. Customers do 
not incur costs to switch between queues. We apply balance equations to capture the state 
transitions and derive the steady-state performance for given service rates and prices, and then 
explore service and price competition between the service providers in a two-stage game. As 
service capacity takes time to build and its investment is made early, the two service providers 
simultaneously invest in service in the first stage. Their service rates, once built, are known to 
each other. Then, they simultaneously announce their respective prices in the second stage.  
We characterize the equilibrium for the above game setting. This requires us to tackle a 
non-trivial system with both continuous and discrete elements. Our results indicate that no 
service provider will simultaneously have a lower price and a faster service than its competitor. 
When price plays a less significant role in customers’ service selection relative to queue length 
or when the two service providers incur comparable costs for building capacity, they will not 
engage in price competition and will each charge the maximum price. Otherwise, the two 
service providers will adopt substitutable competition instruments: the lower-cost service 
provider will build a faster service while its higher-cost competitor will charge a lower price. As 
the capacity cost of one service provider increases, this particular provider will lower service 
speed and its competitor may reduce service speed as well.  
Comparing the results in our model to those in the existing literature, we find that the 
service providers build slower service, engage in less intense price competition, but earn higher 
profits when the customers are unable to infer service rates and hence naive in choosing service 
based on queue length and price than when they incorporate service rates to make sophisticated 
service selections; the customers on the other hand are expected to spend longer time waiting in 
queue. Such effects are more significant when capacity costs differ across the service providers. 
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Moreover, customers’ jockeying behavior further lowers service providers’ capacity investment 
and lengthens the customers’ stay in the system. The service system is more efficient when the 
customers can switch queues in real time, since that will reduce the chance for idle server and 
positive queue length to coexist.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review literature in section 2. In 
section 3, we introduce the model, discuss customers’ service selection, and derive the steady-
state distribution for the queue lengths. We analyze price competition for given service rates in 
section 4; and explore service competition in section 5. In section 6, we conduct a performance 
comparison between our model and those in the existing literature. Finally, we conclude the 
paper in section 7. 
2. Literature Review 
The Join-the-Shortest queue problem has been studied extensively in the queueing literature. 
Haight (1958) derives the steady-state distribution for a system of two servers when arriving 
customers join the shorter queue. Koenigsberg (1966) allows customers to jockey when queue 
lengths differ by more than one. His model is later generalized by Zhao and Grassmann (1990). 
Nakamura (1989) adds service speed as a second attribute for customers’ choice, i.e., an arriving 
customer joins the queue of the faster server when the difference between the two queue lengths 
is below certain threshold.  
In the existing literature on competitive two-server systems, there are in general two ways 
to model customers’ behaviors in service selection. Some works consider customers’ collective 
behaviors, with the presence of a system manager to allocate customers to servers to achieve 
certain long term goal, and, each individual customer, once assigned to a server, stays with it 
until service completion. Gilbert and Weng (1998) characterize equilibrium service rates when 
the customers are allocated to equalize the expected sojourn times at different servers. Bell and 
Stidham (1983) assume that customers are allocated to minimize their expected waiting time. 
Cachon and Zhang (2007) show that performance - based allocation can induce competition 
among the servers to improve delivery times. Other works assume that customers individually 
select queues. Li and Lee (1994) have customers choose service to maximize their utility as a 
function of price and expected delivery time, and allow them to jockey. So (2000) builds a 
multiplicative competitive interaction model for the demand at each server. In Shang and Liu 
(2011), customers are allocated by a multinomial logit rule in which customers’ utility depends 
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on announced waiting times and the rates the service providers can meet the announced waiting 
times in an oligopoly market with service rate and quality competition. Ha et al. (2003) consider 
two suppliers competing in price and delivery frequency, when the customers select servers 
according to a state-independent rule. Li (1992) investigates the role of inventory in time-based 
competition. Cachon and Harker (2002) develop a model where the customers are sensitive to 
price and time, and service providers face economies of scale.  
Similar to that in LL (1994), we assume the customers select queues individually upon 
arrival and can switch in real time between queues before entering service. The fundamental 
difference between our model and LL (1994) is that the customers are unaware of the service 
rates and their utility is determined by price and queue length in our model, while the customers 
are aware of the service rates to derive expected sojourn time for service selection in LL (1994). 
While queue length is generally assumed observable and used in service selection in the existing 
literature and in this paper as well, Hassin (1986) analyzes one server that can suppress the 
information on queue length, leaving customers to decide whether to join the queue based on a 
known distribution of waiting times. Hassin and Haviv (1994) consider a two-server system in 
which information on queue length is not immediately available to the customers who, upon 
arrival, have the option to either purchase information or randomly select one line to join. They 
analyze the equilibrium to evaluate the value of information.  
3. The Model 
We consider a system of two service providers each with a separate queue. Customers arrive to 
the system according to a Poisson process with a constant rate of  . The service time at service 
provider i  follows an exponential distribution with rate i , 1,2i  . We call 1 2   aggregate 
service rate and 
21 



  system load factor. Service provider i  incurs a non-negative 
increasing cost )( iiC   to attain service rate i  and charges ip  for its service. The marginal cost 
for each provider to serve its customers is normalized to zero. We let P  be the maximum price 
that customers can accept, or the value of service perceived by the customers. No customer will 
select a service provider if it charges a price higher than P , even when no customers are waiting 
in line. We say that the two service providers engage in price competition when at least one of 
them charges a price below P .  
6 
 
 Customers are spot-utility maximizers. We let iU  be the spot utility a customer obtains 
by choosing service provider i  with price ip  and queue length in . When service speed or 
waiting time is unknown to the customers and hard to estimate, queue length is the only available 
proxy for waiting time. Assuming that the utilities a customer receives from the service of the 
two providers are identical and normalizing them to zero, we assume: 
     for 1,2i i iU n p i    , (1) 
and call   the marginal queue length disutility. In case that the services are not completely 
substitutable (with different utilities), we can reflect it in the choice model (1) without changing 
the way in which price and queue length affect the choice. We conjecture that the main insights 
will not be significantly altered. In the existing literature, service rates have been prevalently 
adopted to allocate customers into service. See, for instance, LL (1994), So (2000), and etc. The 
reality, however, is more likely to lie somewhere between the customers knowing the service 
rates and they relying only on observations of the instantaneous queue lengths to make choices.  
Informed of the prices and observing the queue lengths, an arriving customer selects one 
queue to join according to the following rule: He will join: 
i) queue i  if ji UU  , 2,1, ji  and ji  ; 
ii) the queue for the service provider that charges a lower price if 21 UU   but 21 pp  ; 
iii) the queue for either service provider with equal probability if 21 UU   and 21 pp  . 
Waiting customers can switch between queues to obtain a strictly higher spot utility. A 
jockeying customer, regardless of his position in the original queue, has to move to the end of the 
destination queue. Note that, when a chance arises for customers to jockey, it must happen after 
one service provider has completed a service and it must be the customer at the end of the queue 
to make the first move. So, while they are waiting in line, it is the change in the relative queue 
length, rooted in the different service rates by the two providers, that causes customers to jockey. 
We assume that the customers do not incur costs to switch from one queue to the other.  
3.1. Steady-State Distribution 
When   21  so that 1 , the two service providers are unable to accommodate all the 
customers in the long run, so that infinitely many customers are expected to be waiting in each 
queue. We next analyze the situation when   21  so that 1 , to derive the steady-state 
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distribution for queue lengths by analyzing state transitions, taking into account of customers’ 
queue selection upon arrival and jockeying behaviors.  
We denote ),( 21 nn  as the joint probability for the state where in  customers are waiting 
or being served by service provider i ; and )(ni , 2,1i , the marginal probability. Then,  
),()( 2
0
1
2
nnn
n
 


 , and ),()( 1
0
2
1
nnn
n
 


 .  
3.1.1. 1 2p p  
When the two service providers charge identical prices, customers select service by the relative 
queue lengths. Note that the difference in queue lengths must be no larger than one. Suppose that, 
at some time, 1n  customers are waiting in queue i , while 2n  customers in queue ij  . The 
customer at the end of queue j  will have the incentive to switch to queue i , since such a move 
can earn him a strictly higher spot utility. Associated with his move, both queues will have the 
same length of 1n , and no customers will have further tendencies to jockeying. Consequently, 
the possible states are ( n , n ), ( n , 1n ), and ( 1n , n ) for 0n . By use of difference equations 
to capture the state transitions
1
, we can derive the steady-state distributions as follows: 
1
2
22
2
1
2
2
2
1
2121
22
)(2
)0,0(





 , 
1
2
22
2
1
2
2
2
1
212
22
)(
)0,1(





 , 
1
2
22
2
1
2
2
2
1
211
22
)(
)1,0(





 ; 
2),()1,1(  nnnn  , 2)1,(),1(   nnnn ,  
2),1()1,(  nnnn  , for 1n . 
The probability that service provider i  is idle is:  
1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 2 1
( 2 )( )
(0)
2 2
i j
i
     

       
  

  
, for  , 1,2 and i j i j   (2) 
3.1.2. 1 2p p  
When service provider 1 charges a higher price than service provider 2, i.e., 1 2p p , an arriving 
customer will choose service provider 1 only when the queue at service provider 2 is sufficiently 
longer than that at service provider 1, i.e., 12 1 1 2( )n n p p
   . We let  
                                                          
1
 The detailed state transitions and balance equations can be obtained upon request.  
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1
1 2( )B p p
     ,      (3) 
where x    is the smallest integer greater than x , be the normalized premium for service 
provider 1. B  is the gap in queue length needed to equalize the price difference at the service 
providers. The two service providers charge identical prices when 0B , but service provider 2 
(1, resp.) charges a lower price and its competitor a higher price when 0B   ( 0B  , resp.). 
By the same logic as that for the case when 21 pp  , we can argue that queue lengths at 
the two service providers will not differ by more than 1B  when 1 2p p . The steady-state 
distributions can be derived as follows: 
2
2
221
2
2
2
1
21
1
22
2
)(
)()(
),0(
n
n
BB
B
n




 





, for Bn  20 , 
 )1,0())(,0()1,0( 22  BBB ,  )1,0()1,1(  BB ; 
2
1111 ),()1,1(  BnnBnn  , 
2
1111 ),1()1,(  BnnBnn  ,  
 ),1(),( 1111 BnnBnn  , for 1n . 
The probabilities that the two service providers are idle are: 
 
2 2 1
2 1 2 2 2 1 2
1 22 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
( )( ) ( )( )
(0)  and (0)
( ) ( )
B B B
B B B B
          
 
           
  
   
     
 
       
. (4) 
We can apply a similar procedure as above to analyze the steady-state distribution when 
21 pp  . The corresponding probabilities that the two service providers are idle are shown below: 
 
1 2 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 2
1 22 2 2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2
( )( ) ( )( )
(0)  and (0)
( ) ( )
B B B
B B B B
          
 
           
     
       
     
 
       
. (5) 
With these steady-state distributions for given service rates and prices, we investigate the 
service and price competition between the two service providers.  
4. Price Competition 
We will analyze the equilibrium of the price competition between the two service providers for 
given service rates in this section; and explore service competition to complete the equilibrium 
characterization in the next section.  
4.1. Profit Functions and Response Decisions 
For given service rates at the two service providers, the price at a service provider i  determines 
the revenue for each service it provides and competes against the price by its competitor to affect 
the initial service selection by the arriving customers.  
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If   21 , or 1 , both service providers will be fully utilized, and the expected 
profit of service provider i  is: 
 ( )  for  1,2i i i i ip C i      . (6) 
It is obvious that each service provider will charge the highest price P  the customers can accept. 
Then, price competition is not in effect when the market demand is so heavy that the system is 
fully congested.  
We next consider the situation when 1 , for which the distributions of the steady-state 
queue lengths were derived in section 3.1. The expected number of customers service provider i  
serves is ii  )]0(1[  , 2,1i , and we can write its expected profit as: 
 ( | ) [1 (0)] ( ) ( ) ( )i i j i i i i i i i i i ip p p C p f B C              , (7) 
where, )0(1)( ii Bf   is the rate at which service provider i  is busy. We refer to ( )if B  as the 
occupancy rate at service provider i , and obtain its expression by (2)-(5) for different values of 
B . Note that ( )if B  is a discrete function. Given service rates, it captures the effects of price 
competition on the allocation of customers and the market shares of the service providers. In 
Lemma A1 in the appendix, we show that 1( )f B  decreases but 2 ( )f B  increases in B . That is, 
one service provider will be less patronized when it raises price. Moreover, ( )if B  for 1,2i   
decreases in both 1  and 2 . Then, the occupancy rate at one service provider will drop as either 
service provider speeds up. A faster service at one provider will shorten the service time at this 
particular provider, and its resultant shorter waiting line will attract those customers that may 
have otherwise chosen the other service provider, thus downsizing the market share and lowering 
the occupancy rate of its competitor. 
Given 2 [0, )p P , service provider 1 can charge any price in 2 2( ( 1), ]p B p B     to 
achieve a normalized premium of B , with a resultant occupancy rate of 1( )f B . To attain the best 
unit revenue, it will obviously fix price at 1 2p p B  . Its decision of finding the best price is 
then equivalent to that of finding the best normalized premium. On the other hand, given service 
provider 1’s price 1p , service provider 2 can apply a similar logic to make price decision, except 
that it will mark down its price relative to 1p  and charge 2 1p p B   to achieve a normalized 
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premium of IB , where I  is the set of integers. Later in this paper, we let I   and I   denote, 
respectively, the sets of non-negative and non-positive integers. 
With the occupancy rate defined as above, we next define, for given normalized premium 
IB , 
( ) ( 1) ( 1)fi iH B B B     , for 2,1i , 
where,  
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( 1)
( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( )
f i i i
i
i i i
Bf B B f B f B
B
B f B f B f B

   
  
   
  (8) 
is the percentage change in )(BBf i  relative to that in )(Bfi  as the normalized premium increases. 
)(BH i  is the marginal gain in revenue to service provider i  with respect to a marginal change in 
its occupancy rate, corresponding to an increase in the normalized premium from 1B  to B . 
The effect of a larger value of B  on )(BH i  is affected by the service rate at provider j i  as 
well as the value of the prevailing normalized premium B .  
By (7) and the steady-state distributions derived in section 3.1, we can write the expected 
profit of service provider 1 for given 
2 [0, )p P , 1 1 2( | )p p , as: 
2 1
2 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 22 2
2 1 1 2
1 1 2
2
2
1 1 1 1 1 22 2
1 2 1 2
( )
( ) [0, )
( )
( | )
( )
( ) [ , ]
( )
B B
B B
B
B B
p C p p
p p
p C p p P
     
 
     
  
 
     
   
   

 
    
     
    
  
 
        
, (9) 
where B , as defined in (3), is the normalized premium determined by the prices at both 
providers. The shape of 1 1 2( | )p p  is affected by the service rate at service provider 2, as shown 
in Lemma 1.  
Lemma 1: For given 
2 [0, )p P ,  
1. when  2 , there exists a 1B  with 1 1 2 1 1( 1) ( )H B p H B    such that )|( 211 pp  increases 
in 1p  for 1 2 1[0, ]p p B  ; but decreases for 1 2 1( , ]p p B P  ; 
2. when  2 , there exist 1 10
L UB B  , 1 1 2 1 1( ) ( 1)
U UH B p H B   , 1 1 2 1 1( 1) ( )
L LH B p H B   , 
such that )|( 211 pp  increases in 1p  for 1 2 1[0, ]
Lp p B  , decreases for 
1 2 1 2 1[ , ]
L Up p B p B    ; and increases for 1 2 1( , ]
Up p B P  . 
When  2 , service provider 2 is fast enough to accommodate all the customers, price 
is the main weapon for service provider 1 to grab market share by influencing customers’ service 
selection at arrival. Given service provider 2’price, 2p , service provider 1 chooses normalized 
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premium B . A higher value of B  will cause it to lose market share but boost its price. Initially, 
the price increase is enough to offset the loss in market share and earn service provider 1 a better 
revenue. As its price is sufficiently high, however, a further increase in the normalized premium 
will make the gain in price be eroded by the loss in market share. 1B , as defined in Lemma 1, is a 
threshold normalized premium above which service provider 1 ceases to reap in more profit by 
further raising price. Notice that 1B  is affected by service provider 2’s price 2p  as the reference 
for service provider 1 to charge premium.  
Suppose that service provider 2 is slow in service, i.e.,  2 . When service provider 1 
charges a lower price than service provider 2, the effect of a higher normalized premium on its 
profit is similar to that when  2 , with 1 0
LB   replacing 1B  as the threshold value for the 
normalized premium. When service provider 1 charges a higher price than its competitor, as it 
raises price, its price increase will initially render a loss in market share that is unrecoverable by 
the gain in unit revenue. When 1p  is high enough, 1 2 1
Up p B  , the loss in market share due to 
a higher price will be negligible as relative to the price increase itself to render a higher profit to 
service provider 1.  
Best-Response 
We next derive the best-response prices for the two service providers, for given service rates, and 
investigate the equilibrium of price game. To simplify expressions, we introduce four thresholds 
values for the normalized premium. Let 0B  and PB  be the best normalized premiums for service 
provider 1 when service provider 2 charges a zero price and the maximum price P , respectively. 
They establish the upper and lower bounds for the best-response normalized premium of service 
provider 1. Similarly, let 0B  and PB  be the best normalized premiums for service provider 2 
when service provider 1 charges a zero price and P , respectively. They bound service provider 
2’s best-response normalized premium. Their formal definitions are given in the Appendix after 
the proof for Lemma1. Proposition 1 characterizes the best-response price by service provider 1 
for given 2p , where, by convention, },min{ yxyx   and },max{ yxyx  . 
Proposition 1: Suppose that the two service providers have service rates 1  and 2 , for given 
price 2p  by service provider 2, the best-response price of service provider 1 is: 
1) When  2 ,  
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  1 2 2( ) B 0,p p p P     where 1 2 1( 1) ( )H B p H B    and ],[ 0BBB P . 
2) When  2 ,  
 
2 1
1 2
2 1 2 1
     0 (0)
( )         
0 ( 1) ( ) 0P
P p H
p p
p B H B p H B B B
  

 
       
. 
3) 221 )( ppp   decreases in 2p . 
Figure 1 illustrates service provider 1’s best-response curves in highlighted solid lines. 
Observe that the curves are piece-wise linear in 2p  and discontinuous with breakpoints at )(1 BH  
for IB . Recall that, when service provider 2 is fast enough, i.e., 2  , price is the main 
competition instrument for service provider 1. As shown in Figure 1.a), when service provider 2 
charges a low price, i.e., )0(0 12 Hp  , service provider 1 is safe to charge a higher price, with 
the negative effect from the resultant smaller market share outweighed by the benefit from a 
higher unit revenue. As 2p  increases, the room for service provider 1 to charge a higher price 
will be smaller and its best normalized premium will drop. When 2p  is high, i.e., )0(12 Hp  , 
service provider 1 will charge a lower price than its competitor to grasp a larger market share 
without sacrificing the unit revenue too much.  
             
a)  2          b)  2  
Figure 1. Best Response Curve of Service Provider 1 
If service provider 2 does not have enough service capacity, i.e., 2  , service provider 
1 has the option to balance between the two competition instruments in service and price. When 
service provider 2 charges a low price, i.e., )0(0 12 Hp  , charging an even lower price than 
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2p  will hurt the unit revenue for service provider 1, with a negligible effect on its market share. 
Instead, as shown in Figure 1.b), service provider 1 will forfeit price as a competition instrument 
by charging the maximum price and rely solely on service speed. Otherwise, i.e., )0(12 Hp  , it 
will have the incentive to charge a lower price to affect customers’ initial service selection, but 
the value of normalized premium is affected by 1( )H  . The jumps and hence discontinuity in the 
best-response curves for service provider 1 are attributed to the discrete nature of the normalized 
premium. A specific best normalized premium for service provider 1 applies to a range of prices 
charged by service provider 2. 1p  will linearly increase as 2p  increases in this range. As 2p  
crosses the boundary of the range, however, the best-response normalized premium will decrease 
by one to cause a drop in 1p . 
An important property of the best response price is that service provider 1’s normalized 
premium, 1 2 2( ( ) ) /p p p    , decreases with 2p , reaching maximum value 0B  at 02 p  and 
the minimum value PB  at Pp 2 . When service provider 2 charges a low price, the negative 
effect of a smaller market share is negligible on the profit of service provider 1, who will charge 
a high price to earn a high unit revenue. When service provider 2 bids higher, lowering the 
normalized premium can attract more customers for service provider 1 and its absolute price may 
not significantly drop. Charging a lower price will become a more attractive option to service 
provider 1 as its competitor raises price. The best-response price of service provider 2 for given 
service provider 1’s price can be obtained by symmetry.  
4.2 Price Equilibrium For Given Service Rates 
With the best-response by the two service providers, we can establish the existence and give the 
specific forms of the equilibrium of the price game, which are characterized in Theorem 1.  
Theorem 1: Suppose the two service providers have service rates 1  and 2  respectively. The 
equilibrium of the price competition game, ),(
*
2
*
1 pp , is unique: 
1) When  1  and  2 ,  
*
1 1 20 (( ( ) ) ( 1) ) p H B B H B P       and 
* *
2 1  p p B  , if 0)( BY  and 0)1( BY  
for BBB  , where 1 2( ) ( ) ( )Y B H B B H B   , )()( 0 PBBB  , and PBBB  0 . 
2) When  1  and  2 , 
 *1 Pp   and 
*
2 ( ) 0Pp P B   , if )0(1HBP P   and )1()( 22  PP BHPBH . 
3) When  1  and  2 , 
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*
1 ( ) 0Pp P B    and Pp 
*
2 , if 2(1)PP B H   and )()1( 11 PP BHPBH  . 
4) When  1  and  2 , 
a.  *1 Pp   and 
*
2 ( ) 0Pp P B   , if )0(1HBP P   and )1()( 22  PP BHPBH . 
b.  *2
*
1 Ppp  , if )1(2HP   and )0(1HP  . 
c. *
1 ( ) 0Pp P B    and Pp 
*
2 , if 2(1)PP B H   and )()1( 11 PP BHPBH  . 
Theorem 1 reveals that the equilibrium for the price game is crucially affected by service 
rates; and has embedded in it a critical relationship between the two competition instruments, as 
shown in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: In the equilibrium of price competition,   
**
ji pp   only if ji   , for 2,1, ji  
and ji  ; and * *1 2p p P   if 21   . 
Hence, it is not to the best interest of an individual service provider to simultaneously 
charge a lower price and build a faster service than its competitor. Price is substitutable to 
service, and is adopted as one competition instrument only when service providers build different 
service speeds. In particular, an individual service provider will charge a higher price when it is 
faster than its competitor. When both service providers have identical service rates, they will not 
engage in price competition and will each charge the maximum price of P .  
We next explore two scenarios with respect to the service rates at the service providers: 
one in which each service provider has enough capacity to serve the entire market, and the other 
in which at least one service provider does not have enough capacity. As we will show later, the 
two service providers engage in price competition only in the first case. 
Both Service Providers Have Enough Capacity:  1  and  2  
As shown in part 1) of Theorem 1, the function ( )Y B  plays a key role to determine equilibrium 
outcomes. Let us treat the normalized premium B  as a continuous variable for the moment, and 
assume that the first-order derivative of ( )if B  for 1,2i   exists and is continuous. For a given 
value of B , )(1 BH  is the price by service provider 2 to which service provider 1’s best price is 
1 1( )p H B B  ; and )(2 BH  the price by service provider 1 to which service provider 2’s best 
decision is to accept B  as the normalized premium. For a specific normalized premium B  to 
arise in equilibrium, 1( )H B B  and )(2 BH  should equal, or ( ) 0Y B  , to make the incentives 
of the two providers be consistent with each other. The conditions on ( )Y B  in Theorem 1 attend 
to the discrete nature of B .  
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2 1( , 3)    
Lemma 2: Let )(BY  be as defined in Theorem 1. When  1  and  2 : 
1. )(BY  decreases in B , increases in 1 , and decreases in 2 .  
2. When 1 2    , for given 2  and B I
 , there exists 1 2( , )B   at which 0)( BY ; and 
1 2( , )B   increases in both 2  and B ; when 2 1    , for given 1  and B I
 , there 
exists 2 1( , )B   at which 0)( BY ; and 2 1( , )B   increases in 2 , but decreases in B . 
In Figure 2, we illustrate the equilibrium normalized premium and prices. In the subspace 
of 3i i     for 1,2i  , the 3( , )i i B   ’s are the threshold curves, as defined in part 2) of 
Lemma 2, for the service rate at supplier i , given service rate at supplier (3 )i  and normalized 
premium B .  
 
a) Normalized Premiums    b) Prices 
Figure 2. Equilibrium Normalized Premium and Prices,  1  and  2  
The discrete nature of the normalized premium causes the price equilibria to reside in 
strips. Consider the case when service provider 1 is faster than service provider 2,   21 . 
By the definition of ),( 21 B  in Lemma 2, we can write the conditions on ( )Y B  in part 1) of 
Theorem 1 as 1 2 1 1 2( , 1) ( , )B B        for B I
 . Given the service rate at service provider 
2 2 , the equilibrium normalized premium will be B I
  and service provider 2 will charge a 
price of )(1 BH  to induce service provider 1 to accept that normalized premium, when the service 
rate at service provider 1 satisfies 1 1 2 1 2( ( , ), ( , 1)]B B      , i.e., when the two providers’ 
  
2B    
1B    
0B   
1B   
2B   
2  
2 1( , 2)    
2 1( , 1)    
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1 2( , 2)   
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1  
...  
...  
2
2
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( 1))
H
H
 

 
2
2
( ( 2) 2 ,
( 2))
H
H
 

 
1
1
( (1),
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H
H 
 
( , )P P  
1
1
( (2),
(2) 2 )
H
H 
 
2  
2 1( , 2)    
2 1( , 1)    
1 2( ,3)   
1 2( , 2)   
1 2( ,1)   
1  
...  
...  
2 1( , 3)    
* *
2 1( , )p p  
  
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service rates fall in the strip delimited by the two curves of 1 2( , )B   and 1 2( , 1)B    in Figure 
2. As service provider 1 speeds up, i.e., 1  increases, service provider 2 will have a stronger 
incentive to lower price to attract more customers upon arrival; and the normalized premium will 
increase. The analysis for the case   12  follows by symmetry. In this latter case, service 
provider 1 will charge a lower price, and 2 1( , )B   will play the same role as that by 1 2( , )B   
when 1 2     to delimit the space for the equilibrium outcomes. B I
  will arise as the 
equilibrium normalized premium when the two providers’ service rates fall in the strip delimited 
by the two curves of 2 1( , )B   and 2 1( , 1)B    in Figure 2.  
At least One Service Provider Lacks Enough Capacity 
There are three possible scenarios: 1)  1  and  2 ; 2)  1  and  2 ; 3)  1  and 
 2 . In the first case, service provider 2, due to its lower service rate, will charge a lower 
price, while service provider 1 will weigh the options of taking on one more layer of competition 
in price against purely relying a faster service. Part 2) of Theorem 1 shows that, in equilibrium, 
service provider 1 will not resort to price as a competition instrument and will charge maximum 
price, and the value of the normalized premium depends on the extent of service competition 
influenced by the service rates at both providers. To identify the specific equilibrium, we let 
 1 2 1 2( , , ) ( (0) ) ( 1)P P PZ B H B H B      . (10) 
The existence condition, as given in part 2) of Theorem 1, can be rewritten as 
),,()( 212 PP BZPBH  .     (11) 
Recall that PB  is service provider 2’s best normalized premium when service provider 1 
charges P . ),,( 21 PBZ  , as defined in (10), essentially locates the value for PB .  
Lemma 3: Let ),,( 21 PBZ   be as defined in (10). 
1. It decreases in 1  and 2 . 
2. For given P  and 2 , there exist ( )PU B  such that PBZ P ),,( 21   for 1 ( )PU B   
and PBZ P ),,( 21   otherwise; and ( )PL B  such that PBH P )(2  for 1 ( )PL B   
and PBH P )(2  otherwise. ( )PL B  and ( )PU B  decrease in 2  and increase in PB . 
In Figure 3, on the space of ( 1 2,  ) on [0, ] [ , )   , each heavy curve represents 
( )L B  or ( )U B  for some B I
 , defined in part 2) of Lemma 3. When the service rates at the 
17 
 
two service providers fall into the area delimited by ( )L B  and ( )U B , service provider 1 will 
charge the maximum price and its competitor will achieve a normalized premium of B . When 
the service rates fall into a shaded strip bounded by ( )U B  and ( 1)L B  , while service provider 
1 will still charge the maximum price, service provider 2 will be indifferent between the two 
normalized premiums of B  and 1B  , sustained as the equilibria in the two adjacent strips. 
 
a) Normalized Premiums    b) Prices 
Figure 3. Equilibrium Normalized Premium and Prices,  1  and  2  
We still observe that, as service provider 1 speeds up, service provider 2 will further 
lower price to attain a larger value of the normalized premium. The analysis for the equilibrium 
of case 2) follows by symmetry, when service provider 2 will charge the maximum price and the 
value of the normalized premium will depend on service rates. In case 3) when neither service 
provider has enough capacity to serve all the customers, they each will charge the maximum 
price. The price equilibrium is continuous with respect to the service rates. The two service 
providers engage in price competition only when they each can accommodate all the customers 
and their service rates sufficiently differ. As a result of price competition, the faster (slower) 
service provider will always charge a higher (lower) price. An individual service provider will 
forfeit price as a competitive instrument and charge the maximum price when its service rate 
alone is unable to accommodate all the market demand. 
2  
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  
  
1B   
0B   
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2B   
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  
  
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* *
2 1( , )p p  
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5. Service Competition 
We next explore the competition by the service providers in service rates, by the equilibrium of 
the price game derived in section 4. We can establish the existence and uniqueness of the 
equilibrium service rates for general capacity cost functions. To obtain explicit solutions and 
facilitate comparison, we let the capacity cost function take a quadratic form, 2( )i i i iC c  , 
1,2i  . In Proposition 3, we characterize the equilibrium service rates and system performance 
for the symmetric systems, where the service providers incur identical capacity costs. 
Proposition 3: In a symmetric system where the two service providers incur the same capacity 
costs, i.e., ccc  21 , if 2 c P  , then, in the unique symmetric equilibrium, 
1. The service rates are 
23 3
* * *
1 2 3
4 16 1
12 612
K c
c K

        , where )427( cPPa   and 
]33227[22 acPcK   . *  decreases in capacity cost c , increases in the maximum 
price P  and arrival rate  . 
2. The prices are Ppp  *2
*
1 .  
3. The profits of service providers are 
2
23 3
* *
1 2 3
4 16 1
2 12 612
P K c
c
c K
 

 
       
 
. 
The two service providers build identical service rates in the symmetric systems. They 
will not compete in price and will each charge the maximum price. As maximum price increases, 
a service provider can reap in a higher revenue from each completed service and can afford a 
higher capacity cost to build a faster service. It is obvious that the service rate decreases with 
capacity cost, but increases with arrival rate.  
When the capacity costs differ across the providers, the equilibrium service rates are very 
difficult, if possible, to derive analytically, due to the discrete nature of the normalized premium. 
We turn to a numerical study to gain further insights. In our study, for given capacity costs 
( 1c , 2c ), arrival rate ( ), maximum price ( P ), and marginal disutility (  ), we apply Theorem 1 
to obtain the equilibrium prices and the revenues of the two service providers for any pair of 
service rates, and then use the outcomes to search for the equilibrium service rates and obtain the 
resultant prices. We observe that the impact of price relative to queue length in the customers’ 
utility and hence their service selection affect the competition behaviors of the service providers 
in the asymmetric systems. When price plays a less significant role in service selection relative to 
queue length, i.e., the marginal queue length disutility   is high, price competition will be of 
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little value and service providers will each charge the maximum price. Figure 4 displays the 
typical results for equilibrium service rates and profits with respect to 2c , for given 1c . 
 
a) *1  vs 2c       b) 
*
i  vs 2c  
Figure 4. Equilibrium in Asymmetric System When Customers are Insensitive to Price 
Observe that the service provider with a higher capacity cost is slower in service, i.e., 
**
ji    when ij cc  , 2,1, ji  and ji  . As the capacity cost of service provider 2 increases, 
this particular provider will lower service rate. The effect of a larger value of 2c  on the service 
rate of service provider 1 is, however, not monotone. As 2c  increases but below 1c , service 
provider 1 will raise service rate as its cost disadvantage fades until 12 cc  , when both service 
providers build the same service rates. When 2 1c c , service provider 1 will outperform its 
competitor by a faster service. But, as 2c  continues to increase and service provider 2 slows 
down, increasing service rate is unlikely to bring service provider 1 a gain in revenue from a 
larger market share that is enough to offset the mounted capacity cost. Instead, as Figure 4.a) 
shows, service provider 1 will lower service rate, but remain faster than its competitor. Figure 
4.b) shows that, as 2c  increases, service provider 1 will earn a higher profit but service provider 
2 suffers a profit loss; they earn the same profits when their capacity costs are identical.  
2  
1  
1c  2c  0  
2  
1  
1c  2c  0  
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a) *i  vs 2c       b)  
*
ip  vs 2c  
Figure 5. Equilibrium in Asymmetric System When Customers are Price Sensitive 
We next examine the situation when price plays a significant role in customers’ service 
selection. Figure 5 displays the typical results of equilibrium service rates and prices at the two 
service providers with respect to 2c , for given 1c . Observe that, when their capacity costs differ 
sufficiently, the service providers will adopt substitutable competition instruments: the one with 
a cost advantage will build a faster service and the other will charge a lower price. This echoes 
our earlier finding that an individual service provider will not simultaneously have a lower price 
and a faster service than its competitor. Between the two competition instruments, prices affect 
the customers’ queue selections upon arrival, while service rates, through queue lengths, affect 
their behaviors at arrival and during their stay. The competition in service rates delivers a more 
influential impact than that in price on customers’ behaviors and resultant system performance. 
The service providers will not compete in price when their service speeds are identical. Price, 
when adopted as a competition instrument, is used by the slower provider only but exerts a minor 
effect on the market shares of both service providers. The other observations are similar to those 
when customers are insensitive to price relative to queue length. 
6. Performance Comparison 
In the majority of the existing literature, service rates or expected waiting times directly affect 
customer allocation or service selection. In our model, however, the customers do not infer 
service rates and are naïve in selecting service based on queue length and price. Moreover, we 
1c  2c  0  
2  
1  
1c  2c  0  
2p  
1p  
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permit customers to jockey, a common behavior in service systems, but many existing models 
preclude such a possibility. In this section, we conduct a comparative study on the effects of the 
availability of service rate in service selection and customers’ jockeying behaviors on system 
performance, by comparing the findings in our model to those in Li and Lee (1994), hereinafter 
referred to as LL (1994), and So (2000). LL (1994) and this paper define utility functions for the 
customers to choose service, while So (2000) adopts a choice model for service selection. 
LL (1994) assumes that each customer selects a service provider to maximize his utility, 
which is similar to the one in our model and is shown below:  
( 1)
          
 for 1,2
                              
i
i i
ii
r n
p if p P
U i
Otherwise



  
 

, (12) 
where ip  is the price by service provider i , P  the customers’ reservation price (equivalent to 
the maximum price in our model), r  and   are the respective marginal disutilities of waiting 
time and price. While LL (1994) also has queue length as a consideration factor in customers’ 
service selection and permits customers to jockey, it differs fundamentally from our model in 
that the customers use service rates in service selection, but the customers in our model do not 
have such a privilege. The result in LL (1994) for given service rates provides a benchmark to 
examine the effects of the service-rate based service selection.  
We have defined the normalized premium for service provider 1, B , to capture the result 
of price competition. The corresponding normalized premium in LL (1994), for given 1  and 2 , 
can be shown to be: 
1 1
1 2 2 1 1 2( ) ( )LB p p    
       ,   (13) 
for which we let 1   and r   in the utility function (12).  
Proposition 4 compares the normalized premiums and the profits of the service providers 
in our model and those in LL (1994).  
Proposition 4: For given 1 , 2 , and   (   21 ), in the equilibrium, the absolute value of 
the normalized premium for service provider 1 in our model is no larger than that in LL (1994), 
and the profits of the two service providers in our model are no less than those in LL (1994).  
For given service rates, the two service providers earn higher profits and engage in less 
intense price competition in our model than in LL (1994). It is because that, the slower service 
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provider will less likely be patronized by the better informed customers in LL (1994) than by 
those in our model, and will hence be more aggressive in pricing to grab market share, as 
reflected in a larger normalized premium. A fiercer price competition, however, hurts the profit 
of each individual service provider.  
We apply the results in LL (1994) to derive the equilibrium service rates and compare 
them to those in our model. We find that, in the symmetric systems where the service providers 
incur identical capacity costs, the same equilibrium outcomes are sustained in LL (1994) and our 
model. That is, the availability of service rates in service selection does not deliver a substantial 
impact on the performance of a symmetric system, in which price is not a competition instrument 
and the two service providers build the same service rates. Since service selection is based on the 
relative utilities, the specific values of service rates essentially have no impacts on customers’ 
preferences, and the system dynamics in LL (1994) are exactly identical to those in our model.  
   
a) 
*
i  vs 2c      b) 
*
it  vs 2c  
Figure 6. Effects of Availability of Service Rate Information 
For the asymmetric systems, we turn to numerical studies to examine the relevant effects. 
Figure 6 displays the typical outcomes with base parameters 0.11 c , 0.2 , 20P , 1r , 
and 0.1 . Service rates do deliver an impact in this case. Observe that service providers build 
faster services and customers spend less time waiting for service in LL (1994) than in our model. 
This is quite intuitive since service rate directly enters into customers’ utility to affect their 
service selection in LL (1994), which provides a strong incentive for the providers to speed up. 
The faster service shortens customers’ expected waiting time. But, the added capacity cost to 
build a faster service in LL (1994) is not paid off by the gain due to the fiercer price competition 
the two service providers engage in. 
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We next compare our model to the model of So (2000) to shed light in the effects of the 
customers’ jockeying behavior. Like LL (1994), this paper assumes that service rates are directly 
used in service selection. But, state-independent policies are applied therein to allocate customers 
into service upon arrival, and once assigned to a queue, a customer stays with the queue until 
service completion. In particular, So (2000) assumes that customers select servers based on the 
expected lead time and price, and applies a multiplicative competitive interaction (MCI) model 
for demand allocation, which essentially translates into the same utility function as that in LL 
(1994): 
 
1
1 1
( )i ii
i i j j
p t
p t p t

 
 
 
   


, for 1,2i  , (14) 
where ip  is service provider i ’s price, it  the expected lead time, and   price elasticity.  
Proposition 5: In a symmetric system where the two service providers incur the same capacity 
costs, the two service providers build slower service but earn higher profits in our model than in 
So (2000). The customers, however, endure longer waiting time in our model. 
The service providers will not compete in price in the symmetric systems where, by our 
earlier discussions, the availability of service rate in customers’ service selection delivers an 
insubstantial effect on system performance. Proposition 5 reveals that, however, the customers’ 
jockeying behavior leads to lower service rates and higher profits, but detains customers for a 
longer duration. This is because that the chance for waiting customers and idle providers to co-
exist is lowered when the customers can switch in real time. The service providers achieve 
higher capacity utilizations when the customers can jockey than when they commit to one of 
them. As a consequence, they invest less in capacity when the customers can switch in real time. 
Their slower service, however, detains the customers longer in waiting for service.  
For asymmetric systems, we use numerical studies to examine the impact of customers’ 
jockeying behavior. Figure 7 displays the outcomes with base parameters of 0.11 c , 0.1 , 
20P , and 0.1 . Observe that the curves have the same trends as those in Figure 6 for the 
symmetric systems. The performance gaps in Figure 7 are attributed to both the availability of 
the service rate in service selection and the customers’ jockeying behaviors. With the same 
parameters, the gaps in Figure 7 are notably wider than those in Figure 6, which strengthens our 
earlier observation for symmetric systems that, on top of the effects of the availability of service 
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rate, the customers’ jockeying behavior further lowers service providers’ capacity investment 
and lengths the customers’ duration of stay. 
 
a)  *i  vs 2c    b)   
*
it  vs 2c  
Figure 7. Effects of Customers’ Service Selection Behavior in Asymmetric Systems 
7. Concluding Remarks 
We have considered a service system consisting of two service providers each with a separate 
queue. Customers choose queues to join upon arrival and can switch between queues in real time 
while waiting for service. The customers are unable to infer service rates and naïve in choosing 
service based on queue length and price. We have analyzed the service and price competition 
between the two service providers under such assumptions on customer behaviors, and found 
that neither service provider will simultaneously charge a lower price and build a faster service 
than its competitor. When price plays a less significant role in the customers’ service selection 
relative to queue length or their capacity costs are comparable, the service providers will not 
compete in price and will each charge the maximum price. Otherwise, the lower-cost provider 
will build a faster service, and its higher-cost competitor will charge a lower price. Comparing 
the results in our model to those in the existing literature, we find that service providers build 
lower service rates, engage in less intense price competition, earn higher profits, but customers 
are expected to wait in line longer when they are naive in selecting service by queue length and 
price than when they can use service rates to make sophisticated choices. Customers’ jockeying 
behavior further lowers the service providers’ capacity investment and lengthens the customers’ 
duration of stay. 
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This research paves the ground work for further exploration. We assumed the customers 
choose service by comparing the spot utilities they can obtain from the two providers. The spot 
utility defined in the current model is a simple function of queue length and price. It is probable 
that the customers’ service selection is affected by queue length and price in a more involved 
manner. For instance, an arriving customer can choose to join the shorter queue or the lower-
priced provider if the relative queue length or price differs too much. Further, customers may not 
choose a queue if it is too long. Incorporating such features into the customers’ service selection 
criterion can make our model more realistic.  
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